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Abstract During nonemergency appointments at traditional sites of āyurvedic
healthcare in Kerala, South India, classically trained Brāhman
˙
a physicians and their
patients seldom exchange anything of substance (whether medicinal or monetary).
The physician-patient interface instead routinely involves an exchange of knowl-
edge. Interactions between physicians and patients in these meetings evoke the
highly theorized notion of the “Indian gift” and the question of prestation in South
Indian societies. This article explores the nature of exchange in the supply and
reception of healthcare among physicians and patients at traditional sites of āyur-
vedic treatment (that is, sites not affiliated with governmental or private hospitals or
clinics) in contemporary Kerala. Drawing on classical treatises about the dharma of
gifts (dānadharma) and the Sanskrit medical classics of Āyurveda, it examines
reciprocity, ideal preconditions of givers and receivers of gifts, and the possibility of
a “pure gift” in the appraisal and production of wellbeing.
Keywords Āyurveda · dānadharma · “Indian gift” · reciprocity ·
physician-patient encounter · Kerala
Introduction
At Mookkamangalam—a clinic in central Kerala run by classically trained
physicians of Āyurveda—nonemergency healthcare seldom involves an exchange
of material things.1 Patients commonly do not receive medicine for their disorders;
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1 To ensure the anonymity of the people mentioned in this article, all proper names drawn from my
fieldwork have been pseudonymized.
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physicians routinely receive no payment for their services. Information is the only
thing that appears to pass between physicians and patients at this āyurvedic clinic,
and it flows in a conversational, if semiformulaic manner, akin to clinical
communications I have had as a patient of biomedical doctors in the United States.
The information exchanged at Mookkamangalam characteristically and unsurpris-
ingly deals with patients’ experiences of illness and physicians’ appraisals of
patients’ bodies and how to treat them.
The interchange of somatic information at Mookkamangalam between physi-
cians, called vaidyans in Malayalam,2 the language of Kerala, and their patients,
known as rogis, calls to mind Marcel Mauss’s classic illustration of gift exchange in
“Essai sur le don: forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaı̈ques” (1923–
24; hereafter The Gift).3 Namely, a contractual do ut des appears to be in play: the
patient gives to the physician so that the physician might give something back to the
patient; likewise, the physician gives to the patient so that the patient might, in the
end, give something back to the physician. In the medical marketplace, after a
patient presents an illness and its history, we expect a physician to respond by
giving something to the patient, such as a diagnosis and prognosis. When the
physician then gives medicine or a prescription to the patient, this act prompts yet
another offering from patient to physician, commonly in the form of a payment.
With that, the exchange usually ends agreeably; both parties leave having fulfilled
their obligations in this particular social relationship. Mookkamangalam presents a
slightly different scenario, however. A medical marketplace in the generic sense,
this clinical space deals almost exclusively in the exchange of knowledge, and the
exchanges of physicians and patients are designed to be unequal and nonreciprocal.
With Mauss’s theory of the gift as a prompt, this article reflects on the motivations,
justifications, and rewards of giving and receiving knowledge in the clinical
dealings of āyurvedic physicians and their patients in central Kerala.
In the United States a gift colloquially designates a one-sided offering. A gift
giver presents a person with something that’s seen neither as a reciprocation for an
earlier exchange nor as an offering meant to bring about a future return on the part
of the recipient. Participants in these exchanges might perceive themselves as givers
or receivers of so-called free gifts—offerings given unmotivated by self-interest or
an expectation of future recompense. Often, however, due to time lags between
initial and counter gifts, people tend to forget or overlook the quid pro quo
understandings of which their “gifts” are a part; or because profit interests of givers
are sometimes veiled in fields of euphemism (Bourdieu 1998: 115), the reality of
free gifts is in fact imaginary. Gifts aren’t really free, Mauss argued. Free gifts are
not and haven’t been part of exchange economies in most human societies. So, after
a physician gives a prescription or medication to a patient, a counter offering is
ordinarily given from patient to physician, leveling the relationship according to
symmetrical prestations. Interactions between physicians and patients at
2 In Sanskrit, the standard designation for a physician of Āyurveda is vaidya; the terms bhiṣaj and
cikitsaka also denote a similar medical practitioner in the Sanskrit medical classics (Olivelle [2017] parses
these three titles thusly: bhiṣaj = physician; cikitsaka = medic; vaidya = doctor).
3 All references to the abbreviated English title, The Gift, refer to W. D. Hall’s 1990 English translation:




Mookkamangalam destabilize this design. The physician-patient relationship is
based on asymmetrical exchange in which a physician gratuitously gifts to a patient
“knowledge for long life” (the literal translation of the Sanskrit term, āyurveda).4
The patient does not compensate the physician for this gift, for, if one follows the
roughly two thousand-year-old teachings in the Sanskrit medical classics, an
exchange of equal prestations in the āyurvedic context runs the risk of being invalid.
In the exchange system of classically trained Malayāl
˙
i5 physicians and their
patients, the Maussian gift is at once validated and rendered problematic. Mauss
argued in The Gift that an obligation to reciprocate an offering, whether
immediately or at a later time, is a regular facet of archaic societies. With this
general observation and his theorization of the forms and reasons for exchange, he
intended his study to present a prehistory of economic and legal contracts that are
found in most modern societies as well (Mauss 1990: 47–64). Notwithstanding the
theory’s overall veracity in the contexts of both archaic and modern human
societies, exchange in the Indian context—seen in classical Indian literatures as well
as modern ethnographies—often deviates from Mauss’s theory. For example, the
Sanskritic notion of dānadharma—the duty (dharma) of giving (dāna)—does not
permit reciprocity. The back and forth movement characteristic of exchange
economies in Mauss’s analyses is anathema to classical Indian gift giving, or dāna.
A kind of expiatory gift given to someone specifically authorized to receive it,
proper dāna establishes neither an obligatory bond nor an equal relationship
between giver and receiver. Axel Michaels has suggested that, “wherever
reciprocity is practised, it is not a case, in India, of religious dānāni [that is, gifts]
but of profane exchange or trade” (1997: 244). Reciprocal exchange (what Michaels
calls profane exchange or trade) in India does not amount to dāna, though it accords
with Mauss’s model of exchange, whereas the nonreciprocal gift giving of dāna is
inimical to that model.
Mauss was aware that the history and practice of dāna in India posed challenges
to his ideas about exchange. In W. D. Hall’s English translation of The Gift, Mauss’s
most telling reflection on the “Indian gift” is contained in the now-famous footnote
61. There Mauss draws on passages from classical Sanskrit literature, including the
Mahābhārata and Hindu treatises on religious propriety, ethics, and law (collec-
tively known as Dharmaśāstra literature), which forbid the reciprocation of certain
gifts (dānāni), especially gifts given to Brāhman
˙
as. Footnote 61 contains the
following lengthy comment about the outlier status of the Indian gift:
Concerning the main subject of our analysis, the obligation to reciprocate, we
must acknowledge that we have found few facts in Hindu law, except perhaps
Manu, VIII, 213. Even so, the most apparent fact is the rule that forbids
reciprocity. Clearly, it seems that originally the funeral çraddha [sic—read:
śrāddha], the feast of the dead that the Brahmins expanded so much, was an
4 A distinction is made in this article between Āyurveda and āyurveda: the former (with an upper case Ā)
is the proper name of the classical Indian medicine, while the latter (with a lower case ā) is that
(knowledge for long life) which physicians of Āyurveda give to their patients.
5 The term “Malayāl
˙
i” designates someone from a Malayalam-speaking community, usually someone
from the southwestern Indian state of Kerala.
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opportunity to invite oneself and to repay invitations. But it is formally
forbidden to act in this way, for example [in the Anuśasanaparvan of the
Mahābhārata]…: “He who invites only friends to the çraddha [sic] does not
go to heaven. One must not invite friends or enemies, but neutral persons, etc.
The remuneration of the priests offered to priests who are friends is called
demoniacal (picaca) [sic—read: piśāca].” …The cunning Brahmins in fact
entrusted the gods and the shades with the task of returning gifts that had been
made to themselves. Undoubtedly, the common mortal continued to invite his
friends to the funeral meal. Moreover, this continues in India in the present
day. For his part, the Brahmin did not return gifts, did not invite, and did not
even, all said and done, accept invitations. However, Brahmin codes have
been preserved in sufficient documents to illustrate our case (Mauss 1990:
146–47).
Mauss acknowledged in 1923–24 that the prohibition against the repayment of gifts
“continues in India in the present day.” This observation speaks to the social
tenacity and dogged authority of classical texts and practices designed to uphold
dharma, most notably The Laws of Manu and the custom of dāna, in India in
modern times. Yet as the āyurvedic example from Kerala illustrates, Sanskritic
commands are rarely reified wholesale in practice in the present day. Even if the
spirit of dhārmic law persists in the present, the letter of that law might not.
To analyze knowledge as gift (or, the idea of gifting knowledge), it’s instructive
to observe, as Miriam Benteler recently suggested (2014: 273), that gift exchange
consists of far more than material gifts. It also encompasses intangible things like
ideas and ritual participation, all of which support certain social roles and
relationships. By exchanging knowledge about the body, physicians and patients at
Mookkamangalam are poised on the threshold of an exchange economy that has
features of profane trade, involving a classic do ut des, as well as features of an
asymmetrical social relationship typical of the Indian gift (dāna). Although it
exhibits aspects of asymmetrical gifting, aspects not noted in footnote 61 of The
Gift, thus both challenging Mauss’s theory and affirming the uniqueness of the
Indian gift, the Mookkamangalam case also adds conceptual nuance to, and
encourages further analytical elaboration of, the ways in which scholars have
imagined gift giving as entirely atypical in India. In what follows, I propose that the
gifting of knowledge for long life at a traditional clinic of Āyurveda in central
Kerala challenges and problematizes research on gift theory in Indian Studies and
Indology, since Mauss’s classic analysis, that tends to treat dāna as incontrovertibly
rigid and “by the book” (that is, in step with classical Dharmaśāstra literature).
Physicians and Patients
The vaidyans who run Mookkamangalam clinic are Nambūtiri Brāhman
˙
as. They
represent three generations—grandfather/father, daughter/mother, and grandson/son—
in a family that has transmitted a variety of Āyurveda unique to the central Kerala




underscore two things: first, because they have not received official degrees from
Ayurvedic Colleges, the Government of India has not licensed these physicians to
practice Āyurveda; second, rather than the mixed āyurvedic-biomedical course of
study found at Ayurvedic Colleges in India today, these physicians have undertaken
studies and apprenticeships that focus on the memorization and clinical use of the
Sanskrit medical classics, especially the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā (circa seventh
century CE). The space that I refer to as the clinic at Mookkamangalam is not a
special area designated for seeing patients, but is part of the residential grounds
where the mother and son currently live. Each vaidyan attends to rogis from diverse
socioeconomic and religious backgrounds. A rogi could be a young child, middle-
aged man or woman, or a senior citizen. Most rogis who visit the clinic are local,
coming from the same neighborhood or district, though some travel distances as far
as an hour away. During a normal week, vaidyans see anywhere from five to twelve
rogis per day, and the vaidyan-rogi encounter has the appearance of being
seamlessly woven into the fabric and activities of the physicians’ daily lives and
other obligations. Clinical visits are interspersed amid domestic chores like cooking,
cleaning, animal husbandry, harvesting mangoes and rice, washing clothes,
entertaining visitors, teaching tyro-vaidyans, and the like.
On a typical visit, rogis and their companions—family members most often, but
sometimes also neighbors or friends—ordinarily reach the multiple-building
compound of Mookkamangalam by taxi, auto-rickshaw, motorcycle, or on foot.
Since there are no visible signs or markers delineating a clinical space on the
compound, rogis and their attendants make their arrival known as most visitors to a
traditional Nambūtiri residence would: they audibly announce their presence or
knock on the door of the residential building (known as the mana or illaṃ). Then
they wait on the veranda until someone greets them. Oftentimes a whistle or discreet
signal from one of the workers milling about the property relays the news of a
patient’s arrival to someone inside the house, who informs the vaidyan on-call that
day. After the vaidyan receives the strangers, the rogi and her companions present a
collective story about what’s wrong. Mookkamangalam’s vaidyans specialize in the
treatment of skin disorders and snakebites, both of which are commonly translated
into English using the biomedical category “toxicology” (from the Sanskrit
viṣacikitsā). Most rogis who visit Mookkamangalam present cases of contact
dermatitis, allergic rashes caused by diet, and inflammatory reactions to insect and
spider bites. More severe and potentially fatal cases, to which I return momentarily,
involve sickness and trauma due to snakebite.
In recent years Mookkamangalam has opened its doors to āyurvedic students
outside of the immediate family line who profess an interest to learn “traditional
Āyurveda.”6 Thus a rogi visiting Mookkamangalam nowadays often reveals his
conditions in a teaching environment. The Malayalam term (derived from Sanskrit)
normally used to designate this didactic component is gurukulaṃ—“family [house]
of the teacher.” Today, gurukulaṃ is something of a catchall that indicates both
6 Most of the students I have met over the last decade at Mookkamangalam use this phrase to designate
Sanskrit-based Āyurveda instead of the modern Āyurveda-biomedicine blend they claim to learn at the
Ayurvedic College.
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hands-on journeyman training and an intimate classroom relationship between a
teacher and a student (hence it’s sometimes described in Sanskrit as guruśiṣyasam-
bandhaṃ, “teacher-student connection”).7 I have observed anywhere from one to six
students shadowing and assisting a vaidyan at Mookkamangalam (who is usually
also the students’ guru) as he or she makes diagnoses and prescribes medicines and
treatments. The students’ participation resembles the activities of medical students
at teaching hospitals in the United States. They accompany an attending physician
to see patients, and they respond to questions the attending physician puts to them
about the various cases they encounter. The current principal vaidyan at
Mookkamangalam (the grandson/son) customarily quizzes his students while
attending to a rogi. Following a rogi’s testimony, he asks his students to draw
connections between their observations of the illness(es) presented and their textual
studies in the gurukulaṃ, which at Mookkamangalam has always been and
continues to be an intensive study of āyurvedic literature written in Sanskrit,
especially the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā, and Malayalam and Manipravalam works on
poison treatment, such as the Jyōtsnika and the Kriyākaumudi. Traditionally,
students at Mookkamangalam memorize, recite, and analyze these texts with the
cardinal aim of clinical application, and on most days there appears to be seamless
continuity between gurukulaṃ textual training and clinical treatment of patients.
Students are taught to cite passages from the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā and Malayalam
works that they think are germane to each patient, and vaidyans go to great lengths
to ensure the connections students draw between text and practice are accurate and
useful.
After learning the reasons for a rogi’s visit, the vaidyan responds with a series of
questions. Sometimes these questions are put directly to the rogi and other times to
the rogi’s attendants (depending on such things as the rogi’s age, level of anxiety,
and severity of sickness); his interrogation is intended to establish the location of the
rogi’s residence, profession, dietary habits, elimination regularity, and family health
history. Once a rogi and her attendants have answered these questions, the vaidyan
responds with a commentary about what he perceives the issue to be, and he
discusses whether or not it can be treated. He might ask one of his advanced
students to try to do this first, after which he corrects and/or adds nuance to the
student’s diagnosis, replete with references to the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā and other
relevant sources. The vaidyan then recommends a plan to treat the disorder. This
plan, loosely translated as a “prescription,” is a brief memorandum or command
called a kuṟippaṭi. A kuṟippaṭi may be conveyed orally but is often written down so
the rogi can consult it again at a later time. It usually amounts to a list of herbs,
plants, and powders for purchase at the market and instructions for cooking the
7 In Kerala, historically what’s called a gurukulaṃ today is related to the eḻuttupaḷḷi, or “village school.”
Eḻuttupaḷḷis were originally intended for the education of non-Brāhman
˙
a male and female youths, whereas
other, much larger institutions like the ninth–twelfth centuries salai and early medieval sabha mutt
(religious temple-centers of learning) were reserved for Brāhman
˙
a youths with the highest scholastic
abilities. Under the guidance, and typically at the house, of an eḻuttacchan or āśān (teacher), students in
eḻuttupaḷḷis took lessons in basic subjects like reading, writing, arithmetic, and more advanced humanistic
and technical subjects, such as kavya, nāṭakas, nyāya, vyākāraṇa, and āyurveda. Menon’s research
suggests the establishment of western-style educational centers in Kerala in the nineteenth-century for all
intents and purposes signaled the death knell of the Malayāl
˙




ingredients into a decoction for consumption and recommended daily doses. With
that, the technicalities of the meeting are over. Sometimes conversation carries on
with small talk, especially if the visitors have been to Mookkamangalam before or
mutual friends have referred them to the clinic, before the patient and her
companions depart.
In some cases follow-up appointments are set for days, weeks, or even months
later. But more often than not, a return check-up is considered unnecessary unless
the problem gets worse or persists beyond a certain time. Because a rogi and her
attendants have been equipped with information needed to correct her ailment, after
taking leave of the clinic they can reprocess the knowledge the vaidyan gave them
should the malady resurface. Numerous times during my fieldwork at Mookka-
mangalam, rogis or their attendants have inquired about the fee for the vaidyan’s
time, diagnosis, and prescription. Each time the answer is that all services are
provided saujanyamāyi, “for free.” Nevertheless many rogis thrust payment at the
vaidyan or diplomatically ask his students to take their money. Irrespective of their
persistence, Mookkamangalam’s vaidyans insist on accepting nothing—no money
or goods—for their services. Even in cases where medicine (auṣadhaṃ) is dispensed
on site to a rogi, the same policy about remuneration holds true.
When medicines are administered during a vaidyan-rogi meeting, the give-and-
take between the two is rather fraught. The fact that drugs are needed indicates that
a rogi is seriously ill. A snakebite victim presents perhaps the most common
emergency situation at Mookkamangalam requiring immediate treatment. A person
who has been bitten by a venomous snake might arrive at the clinic in a
semiconscious state, be lethargic or nonresponsive, or very agitated. In any of these
circumstances the offering of drugs initiates a much more elaborate form of social
interaction than a routine meeting does. The vaidyan responds to the snakebite
victim’s arrival by swiftly retrieving medicinal plants from the yard and prepared
drugs from the dispensary, and he ensures the rogi takes the drugs he apportions
correctly and straightaway. Even when they prepare the drugs themselves in
emergency situations, vaidyans at Mookkamangalam almost never apply the oils,
pastes, or other topical medicines themselves or in any way touch a rogi.
Deliberately avoiding the putative dangers of polluting contact, they instruct the
rogi’s attendants to administer the drugs. Even during nonemergency cases, physical
contact between a vaidyan and a rogi at Mookkamangalam is rare. The absence of
contact is compatible with the nature of Mookkamangalam’s gifting system, where
the polestar of a clinical visit is knowledge. Maintaining physical separation also
speaks to the roles the clinic’s vaidyans envision for themselves in the gifting of
knowledge for long life.
An illuminating parallel can be seen in the practice of blood donation (rakt dān in
Hindi) in North India. Analyzing rakt dān as a gift economy, Jacob Copeman
suggests that a physician’s orchestration of medical services for patients, especially
in emergency situations, objectifies and makes explicit “those always-present and
yet at the same time frequently latent fears concerning the flows of bio-moral
qualities between persons.” In medical contexts dāna brings people “fully face-to-
face with the dangers of social contact” (Copeman 2011: 1059). A vaidyan’s gift of
āyurveda to an ailing rogi without contact evokes the typology of purity and
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pollution that has occupied scholars of Indian religions for decades. It also raises
questions about the tenuousness of the medical profession for high class Brāhman
˙
as,
since this work routinely requires the physician to interact with people considered to
be polluted. That the vaidyans at Mookkamangalam treat rogis without touching
them could be seen as a way for these Nambūtiri Brāhman
˙
as to practice Āyurveda
while also upholding their religious injunction to remain ritually clean, uncontam-
inated by polluting substances associated with the body like pus, blood, mucus,
sweat, saliva, and hair. In his classic, albeit also contested, articulation of Indian
conceptions of purity and pollution, McKim Marriott (1976) argued that people are
exposed to a constant barrage of “substance-codes” that flow from person to person
in the course of regular interactions. On this view, the unease of the vaidyan in the
face of a seriously ailing rogi could be seen as part of a conscious effort to avoid
aspects of an exchange system typical of physician-patient encounters. Mookka-
mangalam’s vaidyans hold to the titular letter of the knowledge system they
practice, exchanging only the most abstract and subtle substances that Marriot
claimed make every person in the Indian imagination dividually porous, rather than
individually contained. Namely, they deal exclusively in “knowledge” (veda) as a
means to ensure “long life” (āyus). As a subtle and powerful form that’s exchanged
via words, ideas, and appearances even knowledge is imbricated in the constant
transfer and entanglement of particles and assorted matter moving between people.
These exchanges, Marriott reasoned, are what make people dividual, “always
composites of the substance-codes that they take in” day-to-day (1976: 111). Gifting
knowledge as medicine might not result in overt contamination. It does, however,
contribute to the continual reconstitution of both the gift giver and gift receiver.
Another example from North India provides a useful lens through which to
understand the form and function of the gift at Mookkamangalam. In North India
the Hindi expression auṣadh dān, “gift of medicine” (Sanskrit, auṣadha dāna),
frequently indicates a form of charitable giving to the indigent (Agarwal 2010: 100).
Auṣadh dān functions as a combined social-medical-religious practice that alleviates
medical issues (physical and financial) and absolves sins. Ron Barrett’s (2008) study
of Aghorı̄ doctors at Varanasi’s Kushth Seva Ashram presents a vivid case of
auṣadh dān. Aghorı̄ doctors at the Ashram give their socially outcast patients with
leprosy, leukoderma, and vitiligo, diseases often seen as the result of grave
improprieties, a potent mix of medicines and blessings (davā aur duā in Hindi). By
physically embracing their patients, they also challenge the perceived pollution
associated with commonly misunderstood diseases of the skin. They offer
psychological and spiritual relief to their patients, who in many cases have been
ostracized for years because of their skin’s appearance and the religious sins
associated with their disorders. Notably, the Ashram’s patients are not the only ones
who benefit from auṣadh dān. Though not a return gift per se, the Aghorı̄ doctors
gain something in return for the care they provide. They assuage the patients’ social
and psychological experience of being ill by symbolically absorbing their diseases,
effectively displacing from patients to themselves the social and religious stigmas
skin diseases have in some North Indian communities. The Aghorı̄ doctors’
immunity to the diseases, despite their oft-perceived polluting contact with patients,




empowers them. Purifying the sick, they uphold a putatively antinomian agenda that
repudiates the restrictions of Hindu purity and pollution laws. The idea professed by
Marriott in the 1970s about substance-code transference thus appears to be
insignificant in the lives, work, and religious practice of the Ashram’s Aghorı̄
doctors.
At Mookkamangalam, the gift of āyurveda leads to bodily restoration, if not also
social renewal for patients, their families and communities, which occurs with the
reestablishment of health. Restoration is patently physical and, in less obvious ways,
most likely also psychological. But in my experience rarely, if ever, has the
vaidyan-rogi encounter entered into areas of moral renewal or spiritual cleansing for
either the healer or the healed. The vaidyans at Mookkamangalam go to great
lengths to separate their medical work from their religious practice, each of which,
they insist, requires a unique frame of mind to perform and offers its own distinctive
rewards.
Who Gives What to Whom?
How can we make sense of the vaidyans’ overall behavior in the gifting of āyurveda
to rogis at Mookkamangalam? What motivates them to do the work they do without
remuneration and in a context that is potentially polluting? On the one hand,
vaidyans and rogis at Mookkamangalam appear to be engaged in a classic Maussian
gift exchange. The reciprocal nature of gift giving serves a basic social function that
is, as Diana L. Eck has argued, “more than a gesture of generosity.” It is an
exchange that establishes interconnectedness between people and communities,
creating “the very sinews of the body of society” (2013: 361). An exchange of
knowledge about an unwell body opens the encounter at Mookkamangalam: first in
the rogi’s prestation of knowledge about her illness to the vaidyan, followed by the
vaidyan’s offering of a diagnosis and prescription to the rogi. For people familiar
with visits to the doctor in the United States, this exchange would not be the end of
it, since it’s typically the offering of a diagnosis and treatment program, not the
mere provision of a medical problem, that marks the first component of a quid pro
quo of the kind that Mauss identified as gift giving in archaic societies. It usually
follows that a physician ought to get paid for her work. Countless rogis at
Mookkamangalam seem to believe as much, as their attempts to offer money to the
vaidyans and their students illustrate. Yet for Mauss if a physician were to take a
form of payment, that physician would not be truly gifting knowledge for long life.
That is, if the āyurveda he offers is matched with a payment, the āyurvedic
knowledge is not a free, voluntary, or disinterested gift. According to the Maussian
model, this kind of giving is constrained by social rules and obligations that are
common in medical encounters in the United States today, where the things that are
given (medicine and money) are based on a long-established system of reciprocity.
If that is the system we are used to, we might expect that the vaidyan’s gift of
āyurveda should be met with a counter gift, such as a payment of some kind. But at
Mookkamangalam the vaidyan neither receives nor requests this.
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Before attending to the matter of payment for services rendered, the absence of
which calls up the topic of the so-called Indian gift, I hasten to point out that the
knowledge being exchanged at Mookkamangalam is hardly symmetrical. The rogi
offers individual, intimate, and experiential knowledge of her illness. This
knowledge carries with it personal and social anxieties that affect the way and
the extent to which she conveys her experience to the vaidyan. The vaidyan imparts
knowledge bulwarked by years of study and professional activity, which is based on
the collection of current and historical data provided by the rogi. This knowledge is
etiological, prognostic, and therapeutic. Such a clear difference perhaps explains
why a mere tit for tat is not adequate for most rogis, who expect to compensate the
vaidyan’s tat (medical knowhow) with some form of tit (typically money). There is
also a sharp difference in what’s at stake for the gift giver and the gift receiver in
this relationship. The patient physically suffers and stands to gain a great deal—
health, reincorporation into her community, peace of mind—by overcoming an
illness. But what does the physician stand to gain or lose? This question, I submit, is
best understood in view of the vaidyan’s decision not to accept counter gifts for the
medical services he administers.
As we have seen, at Mookkamangalam the run-of-the-mill gift of āyurveda (in
nonemergency situations) is tantamount to a gift of knowledge. In the field of Indian
dāna, this aligns with the area of vidyā dāna, sometimes also known as a gift of
learning (Agarwal 2010: 146–47). In the traditional Brāhman
˙
ical context, Manu
held vidyā dāna “to be the supreme gift above other gifts of water, food, cows,
clothes, sesame, gold and clarified butter” (Acharya 1996: 104). The twelfth century
masterwork on dāna, Dānasāgara (Ocean of Gifting, 1168), by the second ruler of
the Sena dynasty of Bengal, Ballālasena, extoled the virtuousness of various types
of gift giving, including the gifting of land grants to Brāhman
˙
a communities for the
advancement of Vedic learning and the gifting of knowledge from teachers to
students (Bhattacharya 1953–56).8 Indeed, vidyā dāna is most often associated with
education (Agarwal 2010: 101). Whenever I have asked the vaidyans at
Mookkamangalam what constitutes the medicine they deal in, they have always
told me that what they give rogis is simply knowledge—though, importantly, they
prefer to use the term vijñāna, which, like vidyā, also means “knowledge” in
Malayalam and Sanskrit, though it implies a specifically practicable type of
knowledge meant for concrete application. They regard vijñāna to be a special
variety of the knowledge (veda) conducive to long life (āyus) that undergirds their
practice. Meant to improve the quality of life of sick people, this knowledge also has
a capacity to liberate and empower. Upon leaving the clinic with a kuṟippaṭi
(“prescription”), a rogi is equipped and educated to treat herself. From an observer’s
perspective, this appears to be a genuine gift, decidedly unlike do ut des, that’s
designed for a designated worthy recipient (supātra), the rogi, who leaves the clinic
free of the obligation to return anything to the vaidyan.
Vaidyans at Mookkamangalam of course realize that most people expect to pay
for healthcare. They also know that many of their patients have been seen by other





doctors (often from diverse medical systems, such as biomedicine, Unānı̄,
homeopathy, and Āyurveda) before they visit their clinic, and in those prior
medical encounters they had to pay for the services they received. From the
patient’s perspective, why should the matter of a doctor’s fee be any different if one
visits a modern medical establishment or a Malayāl
˙
i mana in the middle of a mango
grove? It is here, in the frequently observed chasm separating the vaidyan’s view
and the rogi’s view about the nature of exchange and reciprocity in the therapeutic
context that a number of crucial questions emerge concerning the gift in theory and
practice in India. Why aren’t payments accepted for āyurvedic services offered at
this clinic? Are there simply no types of payment that could match the offering of
āyurveda adequately, such that a counter gift like money would in some way tarnish
the gift of knowledge for long life? Do the vaidyans at Mookkamangalam
understand the āyurveda they give to rogis to be unrequitable? When we attempt to
address these questions, we confront features of the classical Indian theory of dāna
that directly run up against Mauss’s theory of the gift.
A number of scholars have suggested ways that dāna departs from and resists
Mauss’s illustration of gift exchange, most notably on the matter of a recipient’s
obligation to reciprocate (Trautmann 1981; Parry 1986, 1994; Raheja 1988;
Michaels 1997; Laidlaw 2000; Heim 2004; Ohnuma 2005; Copeman 2011; Eck
2013). For example, Reika Ohnuma observes that dāna theory in the three classical
religions of India—Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism—“agrees with Mauss that all
ordinary gifts are reciprocal in nature, only to reject such gifts in favor of an
asymmetrical, unreciprocated gift that bears fruit in the transcendent future, beyond
the present realm of give-and-take” (2005: 106). Ohnuma draws on Thomas
Trautmann’s observation that the classical Dharmaśāstra theory of the gift “is a
soteriology, not a sociology of reciprocity” (1981: 279), as it was for Mauss. At its
core the Indian notion of dāna says the true gift is neither a part of the social web of
reciprocity nor is it an act that prompts a return. There is no redistribution of
resources with dāna. It pertains exclusively to questions of moral value. Because the
relationship between giver and receiver is always asymmetrical, it creates what
Maria Heim has called an “ethics of esteem” that fosters interpersonal respect and
admiration toward the receiver.9
According to the classical Dharmaśāstra model, gifts traditionally go to worthy
recipients, which are invariably Brāhman
˙
as and often renouncers (saṃnyāsin), such
as Hindu holy men (sādhu). Worthy recipients in Jainism are known as strivers
(śramaṇa), while in Buddhism the classical conception of “beggars,” or monks or
nuns (bhikṣu or bhikṣuṇī), typify the quality of worthiness in a gift receiver.
Ballālasena’s Dānasāgara classifies worthy recipients according to moral qualities:
they should be recognized by others, by socioreligious convention and through their
conversation, to be well behaved, pure, and wise (Heim 2007: 198). In
contemporary social practice, gift recipients who needn’t give anything in return
are often people who own nothing, or possess very little, and have removed
themselves from the ebb and flow of commercial society (Eck 2013: 365–68). Lay
9 See Heim 2004, pages 144–47 concerning the “ethics of esteem” and page 74 regarding the
interpersonal moral values encoded in dāna.
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Buddhists’ daily offerings of food to monks and nuns, for example, or householder
Hindus giving gifts of food and coins to the sea of sādhus at the Kumbh Melā
readily come to mind. The monk and the sādhu, as Eck recently put it, are
“renouncers [who] bear witness to a set of values they place over and against the
markets and materialism of the culture at large” (2013: 368). According to the
traditional view of dāna, worthiness of the recipient signals perhaps the most critical
element of the gift in both theory and practice.
In contrast, the gift of knowledge for long life offered by vaidyans at
Mookkamangalam seems to place a different emphasis on what constitutes
worthiness regarding gift reception: the worthy recipient is the patient, a person
in need of a cure. Copeman’s research on charitable blood donation (rakt dān) is
instructive here. His study showed that contemporary forms of dāna in India like
blood donation and philanthropy emphasize neediness rather than worthiness as the
vital characteristic of a gift recipient (though he also notes that the two categories,
worthiness and neediness, are not mutually exclusive). Copeman’s research thus
extends the classical view of dāna, in effect reformulating the notional value of
worth to include need. A powerful result of this extension is that “accountability is
built into dan.” What’s more, he continues, “efficacy is assured prior rather than
subsequent to the gift,” since by the criterion of neediness a person does not present
a gift to someone for whom it is uncertain to provide some kind of benefit
(Copeman 2011: 1064). In the āyurvedic context, the classical Sanskrit literature
addresses the question of need by delimiting the types of patients who should and
should not be treated. Are they persons whose treatment is apt to fail? Are they
knowledgeable and able to follow instructions? Do they have resources to purchase
the medicines they will need? Will they follow through with the prescribed
medications and doses recommended by the physician? And so on. In this way the
compilers of the literature of Āyurveda present numerous qualities of the needy
patient suitable for treatment. Interestingly, at the end of the day, a patient’s need
might actually also reflect the needs of the physician. As Dagmar Wujastyk has
shown,
[In the Sanskrit classics of Āyurveda] the medical authors’ image of the
patient is very much derived from the perspective of the physician’s needs.
Most of the patient’s good characteristics—wealth, curability, obedience to
the physician, and fearlessness—pertain to the physician’s convenience: A
good patient is one who makes the physician’s job easy and worthwhile (2012:
58).
As a consequence, the Sanskrit medical classics are ambiguous and far from
uniform from text to text about who the patient is. This is possibly due to the lack of
specific case studies in the sources from the classical period. And apart from
instances in which the compilers of the literature explored the patient narratively,
crafting stories about the ways in which people become ill and recover from illness
(Cerulli 2012: 147–60), when we look across the classical corpus as a whole, the
literature offers precious few, often rather cursory and conflicting statements about





The gifting relationship between vaidyans and rogis at Mookkamangalam, much
like the classical ideology of the Indian gift (dāna), appears to be unidirectional,
moving from a gift giver to a worthy gift receiver, the latter of whom is not obliged
(and not allowed) to make recompense for the gift received. But as we have seen,
the gift of āyurveda moves from physician to patient. It stands the classical
relationship of gift giver and gift receiver on its head by making neediness the
primary criterion for receiving knowledge for long life (rather than or perhaps as a
type of worthiness). How, then, can we make sense of the nature and role of the gift
giver in this exchange, the Nambūtiri vaidyan, whose gratuitously given gift seems
out of place in the professional practice of medicine? Those familiar with classical
Hindu devotional literature might recall one of the most basic and well-known











ava warrior Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gītā: one must comprehend
what one’s role on earth is (Eck 2013: 369). That is every person’s duty, or dharma.
Having learned that, one should renounce the desire for the fruits of one’s actions in
doing one’s dharma: try to act selflessly, freely shaping one’s actions as sacrificial
offerings of devotion to a chosen deity, while forsaking the potential positive
outcomes of one’s deeds. In Malayalam, upekṣikkuka is the verb used in this
context, denoting to give up or forsake something, such as potential benefits that
might return to oneself after giving a gift. It signals the disownment of something in
the sense of relinquishing it from one’s possession. At Mookkamangalam,
upekṣikkuka is an act of austerity, given that the vaidyans take nothing, neither
goods nor money, in return for their gifting of knowledge to rogis. Yet it is more
than just austerity. It is a veritable “relinquishment of…proprietary rights in the
property” (Eck 2013: 370) of āyurvedic knowledge itself, insofar as they educate,
equip, and empower rogis with an awareness of their bodies and a medical
competency that enables them to treat themselves in the future. The knowledge a
rogi presents is obviously not given unselfishly. He or she expects and in fact needs
something in return. The vaidyan’s dāna, however, appears to be quite the opposite,
altruistic giving or generosity that falls within the ambit of Hindu, Buddhist, and
Jain articulations of the giver of dāna, whose gift giving “forms a basis for further
moral and spiritual development” (Harvey 2000: 61). The rogi at Mookkamangalam
is a worthy recipient by virtue of her need, while the vaidyan is a sacrificer, a seeker,
a striver for moral development by virtue of his or her gratis gift of knowledge to
properly designated recipients.
Conclusions: What Gives?
The suggestion that a gift might be truly nonreciprocal is bound to raise suspicions.
What is the point of engaging in āyurvedic practice if there isn’t an obvious
reimbursement for seeing and treating patients? (It’s worth noting that the
Mookkamangalam vaidyans also do not accept money for their gurukulaṃ training
of students.) I have asked the vaidyans at Mookkamangalam this question many
times, and every time I’ve been told the Sanskrit medical classics recommend that
Āyurveda should be practiced in this way. While it is true that the Sanskrit classics
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say this, in more ways than one, not all of the sources are in agreement about the
policy of offering medical services freely. All the same, this is the interpretation of
the classics regularly invoked by the vaidyans at Mookkamangalam and their
students. Whenever I broach the issue, references quickly abound to sections in the
Carakasaṃhitā that explicitly identify medical quacks as those who practice
medicine without much knowledge and do so unambiguously for monetary gain.
Dagmar Wujastyk’s research on medical ethics in Sanskrit medical literature
suggests that the Carakasaṃhitā is the central source differentiating so-called
āyurvedic quacks from bona fide vaidyas in the classical period. There are two types
of quacks, she concludes: “one is a deluded person who wrongly, though perhaps
innocently, believes himself to be a physician. The other is someone who knows full
well that he lacks knowledge and skill yet viciously persists in practicing medicine”
(Dagmar Wujastyk 2012: 51). In either case, the result is that the patient suffers at
the hands of a quack, while a quack nonetheless takes payment for his failure and,
incongruously bragging about his abilities despite his inability to heal, he blames the
patient for the poor outcome. Dominik Wujastyk has further shown that the
Carakasaṃhitā clearly specifies a fraudulent āyurvedic doctor as one who, after his
attempted therapy fails, points “out that it was the patient himself who lacked
equipment, helpers, and the right attitude” (1993: 762). Fault and failure are always
placed on the patient wherever quacks are concerned.
There is also tension in the Sanskrit literature about the relationship of “genuine”
āyurvedic practice to livelihood and the acquisition of money for the work an
āyurvedic physician does. The Carakasaṃhitā contains statements that could be
adduced to support arguments both for and against the receipt of money for
dispensing āyurvedic treatment. At best, we might safely say the compilers of this
compendium, often considered the literary cornerstone of Āyurveda (compiled
around the turn of the common era), were ambivalent, or quite possibly their views
changed over the course of time during which the text was assembled, about
whether or not physicians should accept money. They were quite unequivocal,
however, in stating that money should not be the physician’s primary motivation for
offering treatment. Addressing the issue with a bit more conviction about the
physician-patient exchange, a medieval Sanskrit text, Bhāvamiśra’s Bhāvaprakāśa,
states that “one who does not recompense for bodily treatment is a fool,” suggesting
that the physician should not only be paid for the good works he or she does but also
that the physician should be recognized as doing good work (Dagmar Wujastyk
2012: 121). In the earlier classical sources, criteria are occasionally set about who
should and should not receive payment for their work—quacks or genuine vaidyas.
Often it boils down to the social class (varṇa) of the physician.
In the opening section of the Carakasaṃhitā, a passage states that only
physicians of the Vais
˙





atriyas should practice for free (Carakasaṃhitā, Sūtrasthāna
30.29). And yet, contrariwise, Kenneth G. Zysk (1991: 45) has written about





aliputra dispensing “charity and medicine” to the poor, diseased, and
handicapped that are suggestive of the charitable practice of freely gifting āyurveda




them today are products of numerous revisions, interpolations, and emendations that
occurred over centuries, and, as shown above, they often present inconsistencies
about things that would fall under the categorical umbrella of professional etiquette.
So it is not clear if, even in the case of Brāhman
˙
a physicians, the compilers of the
Carakasaṃhitā “envisaged a direct transaction between patient and physician, that
is, [whether]…the physician received payment directly from the patient for each
treatment” or if payment might have been made and accepted by another means
(Dagmar Wujastyk 2012: 119).10
If the Carakasaṃhitā presents too many positions on the association of āyurvedic
practice and monetary gain to draw definitive conclusions about whether or not the
gift of knowledge for long life should be gratis or a proper source of one’s
livelihood, the compilers of the compendium were relatively consistent and clear
about why a person would want to pursue āyurvedic medicine as a profession.
The physician striving for the highest dharma should save from pain all
patients like they were his own sons. Single-mindedly fixed on dharma and
eager for everlasting life, the great sages revealed knowledge for long life for
the sake of religious merit and for the sake of wealth and pleasure. He who
practices medicine neither for wealth nor pleasure, but rather with compassion
for all creatures, surpasses everyone. But the one who deals in the business of
medicine for livelihood, he abandons the heap of gold and obtains a pile of
manure (Carakasaṃhitā, Cikitsāsthāna 1.56–59).11
This passage is remarkable in the context of the present discussion for its use of the
phrase “for the sake of wealth and pleasure,” which comes from the Sanskrit phrase
cārthakāmārtham. This edition of the passage is found in Jādavji Trikamji Ācārya’s
edition of the Carakasaṃhitā, which is widely recognized as the most dependable
version of the compendium available today. Yet the arguably best-known English
translation of the Carakasaṃhitā, edited and translated by P. V. Sharma, relies on a
variant reading, nārthakāmārtham, which means “not for the sake of wealth and
pleasure” (Dagmar Wujastyk 2012: 214n409; emphasis in original). Variant
readings are often par for the course when reading classical Sanskrit texts, and the
literature of Āyurveda is no exception in this regard. The example of the variants of
this passage alone, setting aside the possibility of scribal errors in the transmission
of this early section of the Cikitsāsthāna, illustrates the philological challenges
involved in defining a particular work-related component of the medical profession
in classical India. But we must work with what is available. So we may take these
two variants as suggesting, on the Sharma reading, that dharma, the multifaceted
10 Dagmar Wujastyk also cites examples from nonmedical Sanskrit texts like Kaut
˙
ilya’s Arthaśāstra and








al as evidence that payment
to physicians in the form of land grants and royal patronage were also ways for āyurvedic physicians to
benefit from their work.
11 bhiṣag apy āturān sarvān svasutān iva yatnavān | ābādhebhyo hi saṃrakṣedicchan dharmamanut-
tamam || 56 || dharmārthaṃ cārthakāmārtham āyurveda maharṣibhiḥ | prakāśito dharmaparair icchadbhiḥ
sthānam akṣaram || 57 || nārthārthaṃ nāpi kāmārtham atha bhūtadayāṃ prati | vartate yaś cikitsāyāṃ sa
sarvam ativartate || 58 || kurvate ye tu vṛttyarthaṃ cikitsāpaṇyavikrayam | te hitvā kāñcanaṃ rāśiṃ
pāṃśurāśimupāsate || 59 ||
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Hindu principle marking a person’s social-legal-religious duties, is the primary aim
of the āyurvedic physician (here labeled with the title of bhiṣaj), while wealth
(artha) and pleasure (kāma) are dissociated from the practice of the unexcelled
physician. Trikamji’s reading instead brings the original intention of the āyurvedic
physician’s practice directly within the ambit of the fundamental Hindu doctrine of
puruṣārtha, which outlines the four proper aims of human life—kāma, artha,
dharma, and mokṣa.12 The choice to follow either reading reveals a conviction about
where one positions the dissemination of knowledge for long life along a spectrum
that holds medicine-as-vocation at one pole and medicine-as-livelihood at the other.
The term dharma lies at the heart of the notion of medicine-as-vocation in the
Carakasaṃhitā. The physician who strives for the “highest dharma” (dharma-
manuttamam) in the foregoing passage is marked by “compassion for all beings”
(bhūtadayāṃ). The Carakasaṃhitā’s appeal to compassion as the physician’s
“duty” (dharma), rather than a financial motivation, is suggestive of the long-held
hypothesis in secondary literature on Āyurveda that the Sanskrit medical classics
exhibit a discernable Buddhist influence.13 Of particular relevance are the Four
Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni), which some Buddhologists have argued
encapsulate the Buddha’s teaching on compassion—namely, the wish that all
beings be free from suffering. A common argument, initially put forth by Hendrik
Kern in Manual of Indian Buddhism (1896), is that the Four Noble Truths were
known among the compilers of the Carakasaṃhitā, evidenced by their resemblance
to a fourfold division of medical knowledge in the text. Compare:
Four Noble Truths: (1) all existence is duḥkha (dissatisfaction or suffering);
(2) the cause of duḥkha is thirst; (3) putting an end to thirst stops duḥkha; (4)
the way to eliminate duḥkha is by following the Eightfold Path.
The best physician possesses the fourfold knowledge of cause, symptomatol-
ogy, healing, and prevention of diseases; he is fit for [doctoring] the king
(Carakasaṃhitā, Sūtrasthāna 9.19).14
The likeness is perhaps only slight. Zysk has investigated Kern’s claim, noting
several serious flaws in his argument. Following Albrecht Welzer, Zysk also gives a
sense of the vastness of the trajectory of scholarship among Buddhologists who
“blindly followed” Kern’s erroneous claim (Zysk 1991: 38, 144–45; also see Engler
2003: 426n6). A different passage in the Carakasaṃhitā, however, could be read as
drawing on the concept of suffering (duḥkha) in the Four Noble Truths to articulate
an early philosophical position in Āyurveda on human existence:
12 The fourth aim in this list, mokṣa, “release” from the cycle of rebirth and redeath of saṃsāra, is
infrequently discussed in classical āyurvedic literature, whereas the first three, referred to as the trivarga,
the “three things” or “three conditions,” are discussed at length (see, for example, Cerulli 2012: 30, 136–
40, 153, 161–65).
13 In India many scholars have denied there is a noteworthy Buddhist influence on the basis of an
assumption that the earliest medical source, the Carakasaṃhitā, might predate the life of the Buddha, and
it is the Carakasaṃhitā that informs the other classical treatises (Meulenbeld 1999–2002, 1A: 110). That
said, this is neither the prevailing attitude of one of India’s most prolific historians of medicine, P.
V. Sharma, nor is it the general attitude among scholars outside of India.




Everything that has a cause is suffering. It is not one’s own. It is temporary. It
is not created by the self. Yet it arises as one’s own possession. Once the true
knowledge that I am not this [suffering] and this [suffering] is not mine arises,
with that [knowledge] the wise man overcomes all suffering (Carakasaṃhitā,
Śārı̄rasthāna 1.152–153).15
The Buddhist ideal of offering compassion to all living beings—whose lives are
indelibly marked by suffering—lends itself nicely to the present discussion about
gratuitous gifting of medical knowledge. The absence of any recompense, indeed
the insistence that there be no repayment for medical services, suggests the
Mookkamangalam vaidyans view their work as vocational. The gifting of āyurveda
is done for the simple, if magnanimous, purpose of helping people overcome and
deal with suffering.
Given their unswerving responses to my questioning year after year about not
accepting payment for their gifting of āyurveda to rogis, it is perhaps unsurprising
that they see their work à la the Sharma text, as a dhārmic obligation in a
socioethical sense, meant to help the ailing and infirm. Their patients are patently
suffering and in need of compassion. That the vaidyans take no money might speak
to their self-awareness as bona fide physicians of Āyurveda in the august vision of
the Sanskrit medical classics. Yet it must also be noted that the family of vaidyans at
Mookkamangalam has other sources of revenue to make ends meet, which thus
offers an explanation—albeit a potentially cynical one—for their refusal to accept
payment for their medical work. Still, however one views this economic reality, it
only partly speaks to why the vaidyans apparently defy the inherent, if socially
unstated, expectation people have to receive gifts after giving them and to give gifts
after receiving them. This is the social circumstance of do ut des or, in Mauss’s
terms, the “total services” of human societies, archaic and modern that characterize
gift exchange (1990: 13–14). In Malayāl
˙
i society this kind of exchange is known as
sammānaṃ, a gift that is offered between equals in the sense of trade or mundane
15 sarvaṃ kāraṇavadduḥkhamasvaṃ cānityameva | na cātmakṛtakaṃ taddhi tatra cotpadyate svatā || 152 ||
yāvannotpadyate satyā buddhirnaitadahaṃ yayā | naitan mameti vijñāya jñaḥ sarvamativartate || 153 ||
Additional evidence often adduced in support of a Buddhist influence on Āyurveda is that the
Carakasaṃhitā uses a number of terms in a manner similar to those found in Buddhist literature, such as:
manas and sattva are treated synonymously; the notion that life (āyus) begins with the combination of
śarīra, indriya, sattva, and ātman; the emphasis on perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) as
means for the acquisition of valid knowledge; among several others (Meulenbeld 1999–2002, 1A: 110–
11; Sharma 1992: 182–84). The medical author Vāgbhat
˙
a, whose name is given as the author of the
Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā and the Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgrahasaṃhitā (though both sources were not likely written by
the same person), is often said to have been the most heavily influenced by Buddhism among the classical
Indian medical authors. Vāgbhat
˙
a mentions the “middle way” in the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā, and he refers
to several names known in Buddhist literature, such as his first teacher, Avalokita (Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha,
Sūtrasthāna 28.34, Cikitsāsthāna 2.144, Uttarasthāna 8.57; Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya, Uttarasthāna 5.50),
Bhais
˙
ajyaguru (Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha, Sūtrasthāna 27.12–13; Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya, Sūtrasthāna 18.17–18), Avalo-
kiteśvara (Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha, Sūtrasthāna 8.59), Ratnaketu (Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha, Uttarasthāna 1.19), and
others. Other indications that the works ascribed to Vāgbhat
˙
a are Buddhist in character include the use of
the title arhant for Bhais
˙
ajyaguru (this is found in both the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya and Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha); the
mention of a healing figure (dhāriṇī) who prepares a collyrium paste to purify the three eyes (of prajñā,
jñāna, and vijñāna) is referred to as a “Tathāgata” and “Samyaksam
˙
buddha” (Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha,
Sūtrasthāna 58–61); and the Buddhist deity Tāra is also mentioned (Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha, Cikitsāsthāna
21.135; Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya, Cikitsāthāna 19.98).
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exchange. Because the Indian gift, dāna, is thought to contain the “spirit” of the
person who gives it, the gift is understood as a kind of self-sacrifice. Just as the
sacrificial victim stands in for the sacrificer, “so the gift is a surrogate for the
donor,” for which “no return of any earthly kind is countenanced and even an
increment to the prestige of the donor weakens the gift” (Parry 1986: 461).
By gifting knowledge for long life to those who need it, does the vaidyan engage
in dānadharma? Of the two overarching markers of dānadharma—which Michaels
has divvied into seven categories drawn from a collection of Dharmaśāstra texts—
vaidyans at Mookkamangalam follow one and contravene the other (1997: 249–51).
That is, on the one hand, the gift of knowledge for long life is nonreciprocal in the
classical dānadharma sense. It must be unidirectional for the reasons noted above,
not the least of which is the opinion that āyurvedic treatment administered primarily
for compensation is regarded as quackery. On the other hand, Parry has suggested
that in the Indian context “the donor should seek out the reluctant recipient and give
freely” because “the genuine gift is never solicited” by a gift recipient (1986: 461).
On this point the vaidyan’s gift of knowledge at Mookkamangalam doesn’t quite
correspond, in large part because the movement of prestations appears to run
counter to the examples in the literature on dāna, where sanctified or learned
persons reluctantly receive gifts they are not expected to reciprocate. In the present
case, rogis receive without reciprocating. Mookkamangalam vaidyans do not lobby
for patients, and their patients naturally are not averse to receiving the vaidyans’
knowledge. All the same, these exchanges still evoke the so-called Indian gift, since
āyurveda is given gratuitously, without expectation of recompense among people
united in an asymmetrical relationship. Neediness (rather than worthiness) is
notably the basic criterion of the gift receiver. And yet, because the receiver
selfishly pursues the gift giver’s āyurveda, the Mookkamangalam case defies this
aspect of the Indian gift. This case of giving and receiving, in other words, is far
from straightforward.
To move again from the practice of gifting knowledge to the theoretical
presentation of the physician-patient exchange in the classical literature, in the
Carakasaṃhitā we also find the following: “There is no gift to compare with the gift
of life. The practitioner of medicine who believes that his highest calling is the care
of others achieves the highest happiness. He fulfils himself” (Carakasaṃhitā,
Cikitsāsthāna 1.60–62; Dominik Wujastyk 1993: 762). This passage suggests that
by virtue of the very ability to give the gift of medicine a vaidyan is compensated in
a way. It is reasonable to ask whether or not fulfillment and happiness qualify as
return gifts for the gift of āyurveda. This question in turn rouses other questions and
points to other avenues for further study concerning prestation and the gift in
āyurvedic theory and practice. For example, what is the relationship between the
emotional and moral outcomes experienced, perhaps even pursued, by the vaidyan
who gifts knowledge for long life free of charge? Do the rewards of happiness and
fulfillment in some way lessen the force of the free gifting of knowledge for long
life? Do these rewards undermine the component of classical dāna ideology in the
āyurvedic exchange of knowledge between physicians and patients? Moreover, who




long life? Are they not self-generating according to the aforementioned quote from
the Carakasaṃhitā?
An investigation of āyurveda as a gift illustrates the complicated and fluid
interplay of classical textual traditions and present-day practices among Malayāl
˙
i
vaidyans. While the physicians at Mookkamangalam acknowledge and abide by
certain millennia-old notions of exchange that bring together socioreligious views
about dharma and professional standards concerning remuneration and āyurvedic
practice, when textual theory merges with clinical necessity, they rarely reify textual
injunctions in Sanskrit texts in their daily work. Here, as Copeman observed in
North India, we see that in spite of attempts to interpret the gift according to
“processes of systematization and instrumentalization” based on scenarios proposed
in texts, each instance of gift exchange is not “reducible to or definable in terms of
these processes solely” (2011: 1093). From this an important methodological truism
surfaces, and it’s worth restating: ethnographic examination enriches philological
inquiry. Joining fieldwork and philology encourages analytical equipoise and
eschews the liability of ascribing undue or rigid influence to classical texts in
people’s everyday lives. When context sensitive social categories underline
an exploratory theory like the gift and categories such as worthiness, recipients,
reciprocity, and so on, a polythetic study that examines how people think and say
they use classical texts, as well as how they actually use them (or don’t use them), in
their day-to-day activities is indispensable.
It is true that Mookkamangalam’s vaidyans routinely appeal to classical Sanskrit
texts to explain and justify their work. Yet, it’s equally true that they invoke these
sources primarily as fountainheads to be extended and adapted via impromptu
interpretation and practice, using vernacular ideas and idioms, according to each
patient’s needs. In other words, if the texts’ influence is foundational, their
implementation is mutable. Hence, although students at Mookkamangalam learn
many of the topics covered in Āyurveda’s classical sources, from botany to disease
causation, doctorly etiquette to the impact of the environment on human welfare,
and much more, their most important lessons pertain to the epistemological agenda
outlined in the texts. Textbook theory and experiential practice are complementary.
They have been yoked for generations at Mookkamangalam, and they continue to be
conveyed that way today. By listening to and observing the vaidyans, students learn
techniques for comprehending a range of patient conditions and medical situations
and how to manage them. The texts postulate ways to organize knowledge and think
through medical problems that is both methodical and supple and serves students
well when they leave the gurukulaṃ and attend to patients on their own.
With Mauss’s theory as the measure used to query gift exchange among
classically trained Malayāl
˙
i vaidyans, the practice of texts has emerged as a vital
component of modern-day āyurvedic practice. Scholars have known for a long time
that texts are important in Indian culture and history. Contemporary ethnographic
studies like the one offered here, however, speak to an essential point on which their
importance depends. It depends on the people and communities utilizing them. It
depends on which texts are used, for which reasons, and at which times. When we
observe the vaidyans at Mookkamangalam today, the question of dāna cannot be
reducible to a case of śāstric literalism, therefore. These physicians give their
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knowledge freely, suggesting the classical principle of dāna and evoking Mauss’s
famed concessional footnote about the Indian gift. And yet, gifting knowledge for
long life, though buttressed amply by (sometimes conflicting) śāstric precedents,
suggests that the so-called Indian gift too, as a theory of human interaction, is prone
to generalization. The gifting of knowledge for long life is an Indian gift, to be sure.
Accordingly, it is an exception to Mauss’s general theory. As we have seen, it is
additionally unique among classical Indian models of dāna. Adding nuance to
Mauss’s theory and the Indian ideal, in the āyurvedic context the gift takes us away
from the primarily religious domain of classical dānadharma in Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Jainism, which posits a unidirectional movement of gifts from laity
to mendicants, and it opens up the the Indian gift to social relationships of a more
professional, mundane nature.
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